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Introduction. Federica Russo is Assistant Professor at the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, where she teaches philosophy of science. She
started her career at the University of Padua, before moving to Bel-
gium (Catholic University of Louvain) for her MA and PhD. She has
thenobtained several grants andheldvarious research, teaching, and
visiting positions in different countries, specifically in Belgium (at
the Free University of Brussels and the Catholic University of Lou-
vain), theUK(at theUniversityofKent and theLondonSchool ofEco-
nomics), the US (at the University of Pittsburgh), Italy (at the Univer-
sity of Ferrara) and now in the Netherlands. She is foundingmember
of the Society for the Philosophy of Information (socphilinfo.org) and
organiser of the Causality in the Sciences Conference Series
(blogs.kent.ac.uk/jonw/conferences/cits). Inher research, sheworks
oncentral issues inphilosophyof science (explanation,mechanisms,
modelling), focusing on causality and probability in the social, bi-
omedical and policy sciences and on the relations between science
and technology.
Iwould like to thankher for spendingprecious timeon this interview,
where we have discussed the current state of philosophy of science,
its methodological changes and how it can be relevant to comtem-
porary society.
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I would like to start by asking about recent development in philosophy of sci-
ence. In the last few years, the discipline has seen quite significant changes in
terms of methodology: this has been described as a “practice turn” (Leonelli,
2015, p. 814), leading to the establishment of the Philosophy of Science in
Practice methodology (see the Society for the Philosophy of Science in Prac-
tice, www.philosophy-science-practice.org). Themain suggestion here is that
philosophers should focus on scientific practices in order to inform their con-
siderations, rather than using science as a discipline to which apply theoreti-
cal issues. Your work on philosophy of causality and, more generally, the life
and social sciences definitely lies within this framework. I wanted to ask why
you think that this ‘practice turn’ has been necessary and whether you con-
sider this a radical shift or there’s continuity with more traditional philoso-
phy of science. The “practice turn” has been a very important step in the de-
velopment of the philosophy of science of the last years. This, in some sense,
goes back to pre-Vienna Circle discussions, or to French epistemology (see e.g.
Canguilhem, Bachelard, and even Foucault), both of which have been relatively
neglected by ‘analytic’ Anglo-American philosophy of science. Inmy view, once
we put the practice at the centre of our philosophical inquiry, it ismuch easier to
study the relations between different dimensions of science: methodology and
epistemology, in its relation to ontology and metaphysics, but also ethics and
policy.
I agree, the focusonpracticehelps connectingmanydotsofphilosophical dis-
cussions on science, and I would say that abstraction – which remains neces-
sary – should come as a second step, while it is too often the starting point.
I would also say that the focus on practice has consequences on the tradi-
tional approaches of analytic philosophy, doesn’t it? Normally, analytic phi-
losophy is presented as the kind of philosophy applying the “method of anal-
ysis”, which consists in criticising and ‘breaking up’ concepts in order to find
their logical relations (see e.g. Russell, 1918). Recently, there have been at-
tempts at broadening the scope of analytic philosophy, as for instance it has
been argued that constructionist approaches are better suited for the philo-
sophical issues we face today (see Floridi, 2011). It seems to me that these
metaphilosophical discussions are related to what we were saying about the
“practice turn”, don’t you think? Indeed, Iwould say that you follow these sug-
gestions as a philosopher: for instance, your work on causality and eviden-
tial pluralism in the health sciences (Russo andWilliamson, 2007) is certainly
based on an analysis of philosophical accounts, but it also attempts at devel-
oping and constructing new concepts which can then be useful for scientific
methodology. In a recent talk of yours I have attended, you said that analytic
philosophy may sometimes run the risk of being a ‘counterexample factory’
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and the value of philosophy should be seen in terms of relevance. What do
you mean by relevance? Can you give us an example of relevant philosophi-
cal work youhave carried out? Rigour is essential to philosophical inquiry (as
well as to scientific ones, of course). But rigour is one thing, and hair splitting
is another. The reason why we, philosophers, must make distinctions, clarifica-
tions, and all sorts of precisions, is because all these things help making better
science, i.e. distinctions, clarifications, or precisions are relevant to designing
better methods, or clearer concepts, or more effective policies, etc. We don’t al-
ways know in advance whether relevance will lead to impact. But starting from
the practice – rather from an abstract problem that has no ground in any scien-
tific, ethical, or any other ‘real issue’ – contributes to ensuring that what we do
is relevant philosophical research and not sophisticated hair splitting.
Let me tell you that I like very much the idea of relevance as a moving target,
one which is difficult to predict but anyway worth having always in mind. I’d
argue that one of the ways in which we can look for relevance, at least in phi-
losophy of science, is being aware of what fellow philosophy researchers as
well as scientists are up to; this is where collaboration and interdisciplinarity
get into the picture. We often hear that collaboration and interdisciplinarity
are very important values and that we all should carry out research in collab-
oration with others, possibly reaching out other disciplines or areas of exper-
tise. Still, I would say that this almost always remains “on paper” and not so
many researchers – especially in philosophy – actually do that. From this per-
spective, you are quite an exemption, in the sense that collaboration and in-
terdisciplinarity canbeconsidereddefining featuresofyoucareer: youcollab-
orate with colleagues on different projects (e.g. Phyllis Illari, JonWilliamson,
Brendan Clarke) and, often, you also work with scientists (e.g. Paolo Vineis
of EXPOsOMICS, see Illari and Russo, 2014, pp. 258-272). What do you think
this adds to your philosophical work? Would you say that interdisciplinary is
difficult but it also enriches your work? In this sense, how can philosophy be
of help to scientists? I started my career researching causal methods in social
science, and sincemy doctoral studies I have been collaborating with practicing
social scientists (e.g. Michel Mouchart and Guillaume Wunsch)1. As I broad-
enedmy interests towards the biomedical sciences, I also sought exchanges and
collaborationswith peopleworking in this field, for instance Paolo Vineis. Tome
this has been essential to understandingwhat science inpractice is, as textbooks
and even research articles give you a different insight of the practice. This has
always helped understand whether I was working on a relevant problem, or on
an hair splitting problem. And yes, interdisciplinarity (real interdisciplinarity!)
is difficult. It requires a lot of patience, resilience, intellectual honesty andmod-
1Editor’s note: see e.g. Mouchart, Russo, andWunsch, (2012).
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esty. I don’t like the idea of being of help to anybody. I like the idea of working
together towards solving a same issue. If anything, it ismutual help.
Expanding on the idea of philosophy and the sciences being ofmutual help to
eachother, anactual examplemaybe theprojectonEvidence-BasedMedicine
thatyouandanumberofcolleagueshaverecently started (www.ebmplus.org).
Thisproject, indeed, involvesphilosophers, scientists, policyexperts, etc. Can
you tell us something about it? Why did you decide to focus on this topic?
Would you say that it is an instance of the relevant kind of philosophy of sci-
ence we need today? When Jon Williamson and I started working on ‘eviden-
tial pluralism’ back in 2006, we didn’t think it would grow that much. At least,
I didn’t. But I was on a problem that I thought was interesting, and relevant,
and important to the biomedical sciences. The more I worked on it, the more I
discovered that it went beyond the biomedical sciences, and that it needed re-
flections from different angles. So we gradually included philosophers with dif-
ferent expertise (e.g. Phyllis Illari) or scholars with competences also in history
of medicine (e.g. Donald Gillies and Brendan Clarke), and from this group we
tried to bring in the reflections scientists, policy experts, etc2. We managed to
get one project funded by the AHRC3, and then another one. We also thought
we should try having a broader collaboration with scholars sharing our objec-
tives of improving medical methodology and we gave this a (hopefully) stable
platform: the EBM+ consortium. I certainly regard it as an instance of the rele-
vant philosophy of science I have in mind, and it is not the only one. I claim no
uniqueness in this. I just hope that the “practice turn” will produce more and
more of relevant projects.
SpeakingofEBM+asan instanceof the relevantphilosophyof scienceweneed
today, I guess that you would also say that relevant philosophy of science
should investigate beyond natural sciences and should considerably focus on
the social sciences. These aren’t disciplines on which philosophy of science
usually focuses. I would thus like to ask you what social sciences can add to
philosophy of science discussions and whether you could suggest some im-
portantworkoneshould lookat if interested instudying thesedisciplines from
a philosophical perspective. This has been a long-standing bias, most prob-
ably a heritage of the view of the Vienna Circle that dismissed, quite similarly,
problems in biology. While I ammethodological pluralist, there must be some-
thing the sciences share. So instead of looking for gold standards, I have been
trying to understand the conditions of possibility of knowledge (to use a Kan-
tian expression) in social research. One thing that philosophy of the social sci-
2Editor’s note: see one of the outcomes of this collaboration in Clarke et al., (2013)
3Editor’s note: Arts & Humanities Research Council (www.ahrc.ac.uk).
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ences adds is that physics is but a special case. The complexity and messiness
that many people think make the social science less objective than physics is,
instead, the norm. If you don’t know where to start, and look for a primer in
the philosophy of social science, I would recommend reading Eleonora Mon-
tuschi, for her ability of describing the practice of many social sciences and for
her insightful philosophical analyses; I would recommend Daniel Little, for his
views on explanation and causality in the social realm; and I would recommend
Harold Kincaid, for his attempts in finding a dialogue with ‘mainstream’ philos-
ophy of science4. I would recommendmany others, but that’s enough to start!
That’s definitely enoughmaterial to start and I’m sure readers will find it very
useful. Now, to conclude, I wanted to ask you a more general and open ques-
tion. Part of your work is also in the philosophy of technology and informa-
tion. I would say that the significance of this new area of research is twofold,
in the sense that one the one hand its aim is using information as a concep-
tual tool in philosophy (see Illari and Russo, 2013; Floridi, 2008) and, on the
otherhand, it also aimsathavingphilosophical discussionabout information
technologies. Would you agree? Do you think that philosophy is actually ca-
pable of positively shaping our attitude towards technology? My interest in
the philosophy of technology and information is very similar to the one in the
philosophy of the social sciences: debates and discussions that have been rel-
atively neglected in mainstream philosophy of science. Philosophy has a duty
to shape our attitude towards technology, moving away from either utopian or
dystopian views. The philosophy of technology developed by Luciano Floridi
goes precisely in this direction, and for this reason it is a must-read. My per-
sonal interest is in the relations between science and technology, and I hope to
develop a line of research that updates (or upgrades) our epistemological tool-
box, in the light of the complex interactions between the two. To be sure, even
the distinction between science and technology is, by and large, artificial but it
may help in the process of the conceptual design that I think is needed.
I know, the previouswasmeant to be the final question, but something you’ve
said in the reply got me thinking and prompted me to ask another (quick)
one. What do you mean when you say that the distinction between science
and technology is artificial? In which way does such a distinction help with
the conceptual design we need? Could you expand a little bit on that? You
must come to my course ‘Techno-science and epistemology’! What I mean is
that there is a longstanding tradition inphilosophy that investigates the relations
between science and technology, or between episteme and techne. But at least
4Editor’s note: For these authors, see e.g. Cartwright and Montuschi, (2014), Kincaid, (2012) and
Little, (2011).
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since the scientific revolution of Galileo and Bacon, the two have been deeply
intertwined, rather than separated. However, both philosophy of science and
philosophy of technology tackled questions about science and technology as if
theybelonged todifferentdomains. Notable exceptions exist – againFrenchphi-
losophy (e.g. Bachelard or Simondon) should be dusted off. If you are looking
for more recent authors, the works of Mieke Boon, Hans Radder5, or Luciano
Floridi certainly go in the direction I have here in mind, namely investigating
how the two interact, rather than where the demarcation line is. I examined
some of these issues in my paper “The Homo Poieticus and the Bridge Between
Physis and Techne” (Russo, 2012) and in a forthcoming paper titled “On the Poi-
etic Character of Technology” (Russo, forth.).
5Editor’s note: see e.g. Boon, (2015) e Radder, (2003).
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